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Abstract 
Transformations in the “behavioural innovativeness” of species—broadly, the capacity to 
generate new or novel behaviours—are often associated with significant evolutionary shifts in 
cognition. Whilst this assumption is intuitively and theoretically appealing, it lacks strong 
empirical support. One barrier to such support is the lack of a good measure of behavioural 
innovation. This paper offers a solution to this problem by breaking down innovation into its 
components and presenting a novel multi-dimensional framework for characterising and 
comparing putative cases of behavioural innovation.  
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1. Introduction 
In an evolutionary context the most successful individuals are those whose behaviour best suits 
their ecological niche, whether it be in outcompeting others for resources, being adept at 
avoiding predation, or so forth. Environments are rarely static, however, and as they change so 
too must the behaviour of the organisms within them if they are to remain well-suited to the 
challenges they face. One potent means via which organisms can maintain their behavioural 
adaptedness over time is via behavioural innovation: "the introduction of a new or modified 
learned behaviour not previously found in the population" (Reader & Laland, 2002, p. 14). 
Classic examples of innovation include the exploitation of a novel food source or the invention 
of a novel tool type, but the pool of possible behavioural innovations is almost endless. Whilst 
of obvious importance in driving individual adaptedness, behavioural innovation has been 
linked to larger scale evolutionary patterns in both morphology and culture (Arbilly and Laland 
2017; Tebbich et al. 2016), such as the rapid diversification of the beaks of the Galapagos 
finches (Tebbich, Sterelny, and Teschke 2010). More proximately, comparative psychologists 
associate behavioural innovativeness with a range of cognitive capacities including insight, 
problem solving, causal cognition, and creativity (Reader and Laland 2003).  
 
Despite the broad empirical and theoretical interest in behavioural innovation within various 
fields, what constitutes a behavioural innovation is not settled. There are multiple, conflicting 
definitions of the phenomena in the literature depending on research background and interest 
(table 1). For my purposes here, it is worth noting that these definitions tend to be binary (i.e., 
a behaviour is an innovation, or not; a cognitive mechanism is innovative, or not), and split 
regarding the question of whether innovation refers to a unique process1 (as in definition (iii)), 
or type of behavioural product (as in definition (i)), or some mixture of the two as in definitions 
((ii) or (iv)) (Reader and Laland 2003; Arbilly and Laland 2017).  
 
That there are multiple definitions of behavioural innovation in the literature is hardly 
surprising given the broad interest in the phenomena. A non-trivial amount of ink has been spilt 
trying to establish a definition that suits all parties and reflects the biological realities of the 
phenomenon (Overington et al. 2011; Reader and Laland 2003; Ramsey, Bastian, and Van 
schaik 2007b; 2007c; Tebbich et al. 2016). Establishing what cognitive processes underlie 
behavioural innovation and its evolutionary implications, however, does not (and should not) 
require us to have a concrete and agreed definition from the outset. Rather, we can come to 
learn what is the best definition through broad enquiry about innovation aimed at better 
understanding the phenomena and refining our ontology as we go. It is in this spirit that the 
multi-dimensional framework for characterising and comparing putative cases of behavioural 
innovativeness presented in this paper has been developed. It is aimed at helping us to focus 
our investigations of the causes of behavioural innovation, the evolutionary role of innovation, 
and the evolutionary drivers of innovativeness within species. Significantly, this framework 
(inspired by Arbilly and Laland’s (2017) discussion of the  “magnitude of innovation”) sits 
 
1 As in a process which is qualitatively distinct from related processes such as exploration and learning.  
Pre-Print: Do not cite without permission 
  3 
outside of the debate regarding the appropriate definition of innovation and its nature, acting 
as a tool for guided inquiry intended to help resolve such a debate.  
 
 
Table 1:  Four prominent definitions of innovation in the literature of comparative 
psychology. 
 
My analysis begins by introducing Arbilly and Laland’s (2017) novel quantitative measure the 
magnitude of innovation—the degree to which an innovative behaviour is novel (§2.1) One of 
the advantages of employing such a measure is that it allows us to compare and contrast the 
impacts of different types of innovation in an evolutionary context. Using some paradigmatic 
examples of foraging innovation, I show, however that magnitude as construed by Arbilly and 
Laland (2017) has limited usefulness as a measure of innovativeness beyond the modelling 
context for which they developed it (§2.2). In the remainder of the paper (§3), I demonstrate 
how their simple magnitude measure can be further developed for broader use. I begin by using 
discussions of the wire-bending behaviour of Betty, the New Caledonian Crow to break down 
innovation into its components (§3.1). Although further evidence has now undermined this 
interpretation, Betty’s behaviour was seen by many to be a paradigmatic case of animal 
innovation. Understanding why this was so and looking at why it is no longer considered as 
such, gives insight into the components or parameters of innovation. We can then represent 
these as a multidimensional space which allows us to represent variation between innovation 
along these different parameters (§3.2). This framework has several virtues (§3.3): it allows us 
to capture similarities and differences between cases of behavioural innovation that are 
frequently obscured in discussions of innovation, it allows us to identify commonalities within 
clusters of behavioural innovation in the tree of life that can then be empirically investigated, 
Definition Source 
(i) “An innovation can be: a solution to a novel problem, or a 
novel solution to an old one; a communication signal not 
observed in other individuals in the group (at least at that time) 
or an existing signal used for a new purpose; a new ecological 
discovery such as a food item not previously part of the diet 
of the group.” 
(Kummer and Goodall 
1985, 205) 
(ii) "the introduction of a new or modified learned behaviour 
not previously found in the population" 
(Reader & Laland, 2002, 
p. 14) 
(iii) "the process that generates in an individual a novel 
learned behaviour that is not simply a consequence of social 
learning or environmental induction." 
(Ramsey, Bastian, and 
Van schaik 2007a, 393) 
(iv) "In the physical realm, a behavioural innovation is a new, 
useful, and potentially transmitted learned behaviour, arising 
from asocial learning (innovation by independent invention) 
or a combination of asocial and social learning (innovation by 
modification), that is produced so as to successfully solve a 
novel problem or an existing problem in a novel manner.” 
(Carr, Kendal, and 
Flynn 2016, 1515) 
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and it allows us to identify the impact of major transitions in cognition on the innovativeness 
of species. Untimely, it will allow us to test the idea that transitions in cognition generate 
transformations in behavioural innovativeness and other claims about the underlying causal 
history of novel behaviours of this type. 
 
 
2. Magnitude of Innovation 
 
2.1 Ordering innovations on a scale 
Arbilly and Laland (2017) propose a novel quantitative measure the magnitude of innovation 
for use in modelling the evolution of behavioural innovation. They define magnitude of 
innovation as the degree to which an innovative behaviour is novel, the measure being 
quantifiable as the deviation of an innovation from the mean behaviour of the population.  
 
Arbilly and Laland’s (2017) measure offers a principled way of ordering innovations from low 
magnitude to high magnitude (see figure 1). They demonstrate, through a variety of models, 
the utility of the measure in thinking about the evolutionary implications of innovations of 
different degrees of novelty. Whilst this simple approach to measuring innovation is fit for 
Arbilly and Laland’s (2017) purpose in modelling evolution, magnitude by itself is 
insufficiently nuanced for the further purpose of classifying different cases of innovation in the 
real world. In the next section I make these limitations clearer, before offering a more 
developed account of magnitude in Section 4 which overcomes these challenges. 
 
 
Figure 1: Magnitude of innovation as a way of ordering behavioural innovations according 
to the degree of novelty from the behavioural norm that they represent. The putative 
examples and ordering are drawn from Arbilly and Laland (2017). Created with 
biorender.com 
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2.2 Limits to magnitude 
Ordering innovations from low to high magnitude is not straight-forward, particularly when 
we are looking at innovations in multiple species and across different domains (i.e., foraging 
versus predator avoidance). To illustrate, consider two highly cited examples of innovation:   
(a) Imo potato washing: In the 1960s, primatologists studying in the behaviour of a troop 
Japanese macaques left sweet potatoes on a beach to entice the local macaques into the 
open to feed. To their surprise one young female Japanese macaque, Imo, was observed 
to spontaneously wash her sweet potatoes in the sea before eating them. Other 
macaques in the troop observed Imo’s potato washing innovation and the practice 
subsequently spread rapidly throughout the population and was embellished upon  
(Kawai 1965). Imo’s behaviour was startling because, while researchers had observed 
the macaques brushing dirt off their food, they had not observed any individuals 
washing food—this was a novel behaviour to the group, and a clear example of 
behavioural innovation. 
(b) British tit milk bottle opening: First observed in the 1920s but ultimately seen to 
independently arrive over multiple sites in the 20th Century British tits (great tits and 
blue tits) have learned to peck the foil caps of milk bottles left on doorsteps to get drink 
the cream (Hinde and Fisher 1951; Fisher and Hinde 1949; Lefebvre 1995). Whilst 
neither the motor action itself (pecking), nor the context in which pecking occurs 
(foraging) are novel, the food source being accessed clearly is and hence why this is 
also considered a clear case of behavioural innovation.  
With our cases clear, let us now consider how we should score them regarding magnitude.  
 
Whilst both are foraging innovations, they differ along some dimensions. When potato 
washing, Imo employs a motor action (wiping) which is already part of the repertoire of her 
population. She also uses the action to solve a problem where that that motor action is typically 
used (to clean dirty potatoes). What is novel is that she is using the behaviour in a different 
context than is typically seen in the population (washing in water rather than brushing on land). 
In contrast, although the British Tits are also using an existing motor action in their repertoire 
(pecking), it is to access an entirely new food stuff (cream) found in an entirely novel context 
(milk bottles on doorsteps). Whilst both the milk bottle opening and potato washing would not 
be classed as high magnitude innovations on Arbilly and Laland’s (2017) scale, neither falls 
neatly into the low magnitude category, and I struggle when trying to assess which is ‘more 
innovative’ than the other. This is because how exactly we quantify “deviation from mean 
behaviour of the population” is un-specified by Laland and Arbilly (2017)2 and it is unclear 
how to integrate the varying degrees of novelty that the two innovations exhibit across the 
different dimensions of innovation into an overall measure. More is needed if we are to use the 
concept of magnitude in an empirical context. 
 
In what follows, I offer an alternative approach which builds on the basic insight offered by 
Arbilly and Laland – that the deviation of an innovation from the mean behaviour of the 
 
2 This is not a criticism of their work; they do not need an empirically tractable specification for their purposes. 
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population can be used to order novelties—which is empirically tractable and useful.  I begin 
by breaking down innovation into its basic dimensions in more detail.  
 
 
3. The multi-dimensional alternative 
 
3.1 Opening the black box: an analysis of a paradigmatic case of innovation 
There are several dimensions of characteristic of the behaviours which are cited in the literature 
when talking about whether something is an innovation. The case of Betty the New Caledonian 
Crow, once classed a paradigmatic example of a high magnitude behavioural innovation, 
illustrates well what these are.  
 
Famously, Betty unexpectedly appeared to spontaneously bend a straight piece of garden wire 
in her enclosure into a hooked tool in order to lift a small food-bated bucket from a plastic well 
(Weir, Chappell, and Kacelnik 2002). Whilst New Caledonian Crows do manufacture and use 
twig and leaf tools in the wild (Hunt and Gray 2004), Betty had no experience with wire and 
appeared to be manipulating it in an innovative manner to solve a novel problem. In follow up 
studies Betty was also observed to manipulate another novel material (aluminium strips) in the 
same manner to make a hooked tool to solve similar problems (Weir and Kacelnik 2006).  
 
Unsurprisingly, Betty’s behaviour was lauded as a paradigmatic example of animal innovation 
and animal intelligence. Subsequent observations and experiments by Rutz et al. (2016) have 
taken some of the sheen off Betty’s feats. Specifically, they show that the bending behaviour 
and particular motor actions observed in Betty are expressed by wild birds in bending their 
natural hooked stick tools so she may have simply been demonstrating a relatively stereotypical 
species-typical behaviour rather. This new evidence does not undermine the claim that Betty’s 
wire bending is a behavioural innovation of some order (it is a novel solution to a novel 
problem), but it does undermine its status as an extreme example of animal intelligence and of 
a high magnitude innovation. Looking at the original descriptions of Betty’s wire bending 
innovation (before more information about the baseline behaviours of the species were known) 
remains informative of what a paradigmatic behavioural innovation looks like.  
 
Betty’s behaviour was viewed as a maximal case of animal innovation—something very 
startling and special. Why? In the original paper describing the behaviour Weir et al. (2002, 
981) state,   
“…at least one of our birds is capable of novel tool modification for 
a specific task. In the wild, New Caledonian crows make at least two 
sorts of hook tools using distinct techniques but the method used by 
our female crow is different from those previously reported and 
would be unlikely to be effective with natural materials. She had 
little exposure to and no prior training with pliant material, and we 
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have never observed her to perform similar actions with either pliant 
or nonpliant objects.” 
 
Even in presenting evidence to counter the dominant analysis Rutz et al. (2016, 1), offer the 
following as reason why Betty’s behaviour “shook the field of comparative cognition”,  
“Although it was known at the time that these tropical corvids 
manufacture hooked foraging tools from forked twigs in the wild, 
Betty’s wire-bending method appeared to be a spontaneous, 
innovative solution to a novel problem.”  
 
Drawing on both these quotes, three features of Betty’s behaviour appear to have been 
particularly salient to the assessment of it as being a high magnitude innovation:  
(i) Her apparent lack of experience with the wire (and other pliant material),  
(ii) the apparently novel behavioural action (bending) which she performed, and 
(iii) the novelty of the problem she solved.  
Other features of the Betty case typically emphasised are:  
(iv) spontaneity of the behaviour (i.e., that it arose without extensive trial and error), 
and  
(v) that it was robustly repeated (i.e., suggesting that it was not accidental or 
undirected action). 
 
Whilst not displaying analogues of all these features, Imo’s potato washing and the British tit 
milk bottle opening display some of them. The potato washing innovation involved analogues 
to (iii), (iv) and (v). The tit milk bottle opening is similar with respect to (i), (iii)3, and (v). In 
short, it appears necessary for something to be an innovation that it has at least some of these 
properties. In the next section, I use this insight to build my novel framework for thinking about 
and representing behavioural innovation.  
 
3.2 A more nuanced approach: mapping behavioural innovation 
The five different dimensions of innovation outlined in the previous section can be represented 
in simple a multidimensional space with simple orderings on the dimensions which draw on 
Arbilly & Laland’s (2017) magnitude concept (figure 2). The centre of the space represents a 
complete lack of innovation (i.e., behaviours which do not deviate from the mean behaviour of 
the species in any respect, and entirely lack spontaneity and robustness). The further you move 
from the centre of the space along each of the dimensions (i)-(iii) the more novel the behaviour 
is in that dimension. Similarly, spontaneity and robustness increase along dimensions (iv) and 
(v) respectively. When we map behaviours in this space (as shown for Betty’s behaviour as 
originally assessed in the darker line, and as assessed following revisionary evidence in the 
lighter line), we can represent overall magnitude of innovation. High magnitude innovations 
 
3 It is likely this behaviour arose through trial and error, rather than spontaneous innovation 
(Aplin, Sheldon, and Morand-Ferron 2013) 
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will produce mapping which tend towards the edges of the space along the various parameters 
(as for the original assessment of Betty’s behaviour). Lower magnitude innovations will 
produce mappings which lie closer to the centre.  
 
 
Figure 2: Comparing the original assessment of Betty’s behaviour as a maximal innovation 
to the revised assessment which considers the evidence of tool bending behaviour in the wild. 
Created using biorender.com 
 
Note that, for the purposes of simplicity of presentation here I have used a simple radial graph 
to represent the dimensions of innovation. In practice, a hyperdimensional space may be more 
objective. For example, representations within such a hyperdimensional space would not be 
sensitive to the arrangement of the dimensions in the way that they are in a two-dimensional 
radial graph. Whilst a reason to be cautious in use of the two-dimensional representation I think 
such a graph still has value (see following section). Turning now to the virtues of this overall 
approach. 
 
3.3 Virtues of the multidimensional framework 
There are several benefits to characterising behavioural innovations multidimensionally and 
representing those characterisations visually as I have here. 
 
I. A multidimensional approach allows us to make more accurate and nuanced comparisons of 
cases of innovation 
Using a multidimensional approach to behavioural innovation allows us to compare examples 
of innovation and their degree of novelty without having to come up with an overall measure 
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of novelty required for a magnitude assessment. As outlined in §2.2, whilst both Imo’s potato 
washing and the British tit milk bottle opening fall somewhere in the middle of Arbilly and 
Laland’s (2007) measure (both are foraging for new food), this tells us little about key features 
of the cases and tends to obscure important differences. When we focus merely on overall 
magnitude, for example, we lose sight of the fact that that British tit milk bottle opening 
innovation involves accident and trial-and-error, whilst Imo’s behaviour is thought to have 
been far more directed in nature. This sort of difference can however be easily captured in this 
multidimensionally without obscuring that the cases are of similar magnitude at the coarse 
grain (see figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: The multidimensional approach allows us to capture both magnitude (as the area 
within the mapping of a behaviour) and variation along dimensions of innovation. 
Created using biorender.com 
 
 
II. The framework allows comparisons of innovativeness within species 
Another virtue of the framework is that it allows us to both compare the features of different 
innovations and simply and easily look for patterns in those features and think about their 
significance. For example, within species we can explore the drivers of innovation by asking 
questions like: do macaque behavioural innovations typically produce a similar mapping? If 
they do, it seems likely that there are common mechanisms and constraints in their cognition 
of some sort. Similarly, we can look at how innovativeness changes over the lifetime of 
individuals within species and consider how this ties to life history. Do the innovations of 
younger individuals, differ from those of older individuals? Why? The novel framework 
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outlined here provides a systematic way to respond to these questions because it makes it 
possible to easily and simply compare the innovativeness of individual macaques, and consider 
how their life history and experience influences the trait.    
 
III. The framework allows comparison of innovativeness across species and clades.  
Phylogenetic comparisons are a key source of evidence for hypothesising about the role of 
cognitive evolution in transitions in innovativeness. Without a clear way of representing 
innovativeness and differences in innovativeness between species, such phylogenetic 
comparison is difficult. The multidimensional framework offers a means to make such 
comparisons in a systematic way by allowing us to look for types of mappings which are 
exemplified by a particular lineage or clade (see hypothetical example in figure 4). For 
example, if there are no innovations observed involving novel motor action within a lineage 
(as in the uppermost three lineages in the phylogeny in figure 4), this seems reasonable reason 
to believe that there is some sort of constraint acting on innovation along this dimension. In a 
similar way, the presence of lots of innovations which involve engagement with novel 
materials, might imply an important role for neophilia in innovation in that lineage.  
 
Figure 4: Looking at the distribution of mappings in a phylogenetic context can be telling of 
the underlying mechanisms and their evolutionary history. 
Created using biorender.com 
 
 
Using the multidimensional framework, we can look not only at clusters in types of innovation 
within the tree of life but also at patterns in how innovation changes over evolutionary time. 
For example, there are phylogenetic patterns in the mappings we would expect to see if 
transitions in innovation have been driven by transitions in cognition (assuming those 
transitions are marked in the way that transitions in biological organisation are). Specifically, 
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we would expect to see that there are apparent path dependencies in the mappings (you only 
get mapping x evolve, after mapping y).  
 
4. Conclusions 
The multidimensional framework for measuring, representing, and theorising about innovation 
presented in this paper is novel for its focus on capturing the heterogeneity of the many 
different types of novel behaviours which fall under the umbrella of behavioural innovation. 
This heterogeneity is key to understanding both the many ways in which innovations arise, but 
also the role of innovation in evolution. Whilst a valuable and informative way to represent 
and think about innovation, the framework is only a first step in a broader endeavour. As we 
learn more about innovation, the dimensions within the framework may change, 
interdependences between the dimensions may become apparent, and scales will be refined. 
The framework offered here allows us, however, to begin to answer these questions in a way 
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